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Vacation Pay for Rehired Veterans
Harry Montgomery Leet
I
The Problem
ALTHOUGH RETURN of veterans to civilian life following the recent
war has largely been completed, some of the problems created by this
return still loom large. Among these is the question how far the statutes
requiring that the serviceman be rehired- excuse him from meeting con-
ditions of eligibility for vacation pay where his military service prevented
him from meeting the conditions. Collective bargaining agreements or
employer practices generally provide vacations (or pay in lieu thereof)
for employees who meet one or more of these requirements: (1) are
in the employ for a given
period, (2) work during
AM. LEET (A.B., 1938, and LL.B., 1940, West- a specified percentage of
ern Reserve University) is Chief, Veterans' Re- a period preceding the va-
employment Section, Office of the Solicitor, and (3) are on the
U.S. Department of Labor, and is a member of cation,
the Ohio and New York bars. job on a particular day,
usually at the end of the
vacation year.2 Language
imposing these conditions varies widely, especially as to the degree of
definiteness with which work on the job is required.3
Veterans have claimed longer vacations where their military service
plus prior employment equaled the number of years of employment re-
quired for the longer vacation. They have claimed vacations for the
'Section 8 of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, 54 STAT. 890, as
amended, 50 U.S.C. App. § 308 (1946), is the basic provision:
"b) In the case of any such person who, in order to perform such training and
service, has left or leaves a position, other than a temporary position, in the employ
of any employer, and who (1) receives such certificate, (2) is still qualified to per-
form the duties of such position, and (3) makes application for reemployment
within ninety days after he is relieved from such training and service- or from
hospitalization continuing after discharge for a period of not more than one year -
"(B) if such position was in the employ of a private employer, such employer
shall restore such person to such position or to a position of like seniority, status,
and pay unless the employer's circumstances have so changed as to make it impossible
or unreasonable to do so;
"(c) Any person who is restored to a position in accordance with the provisions
of paragraph (A) or (B) of subsection (b) shall be considered as having been on
furlough or leave of absence during his period of training and service in the land
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year of their induction or return, where their absence in military service
prevented their meeting one of the conditions. And where a specified
amount of work is required, they have sought to prorate their vacation
to the amount of work they performed. Disagreements arise because the
collective bargaining agreement or employer's custom prohibits crediting
time away from the job toward vacation pay, or is ambiguous in this
respect.
The Supreme Court in Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp.,
held that Sections 8(b) and 8(c) of the Selective Training and Service
Act 5 confer no "superseniority" on the veteran, but guarantee him against
any "loss of ground" because of his military service. Employers contend
that this rule applies only to seniority; that the only provisions of the
Act relating to vacation pay are those clauses of 8 (c) granting the veteran
the right (1) to be "considered as having been on furlough or leave of
absence," and (2) to "insurance and other benefits offered by the em-
ployer pursuant to established rules and practices relating to employees
on furlough or leave of absence in effect with the employer at the time
such person was inducted"; and that unless there is an affirmative prac-
tice or agreement permitting all time on leave to be counted toward vaca-
tions, military service is not a substitute for compliance with the vacation
requirements.
The veterans answer that even if these clauses relate to vacation pay
(which is not certain) they establish a floor rather than a ceiling for it;
that vacation pay and similar benefits are part of the employee's "posi-
or naval forces, shall be so restored without loss of seniority, shall be entitled to
participate in insurance or other benefits offered by the employer pursuant to es-
tablished rules and practices relating to employees on furlough or leave of absence
in effect with the employer at the time such person was inducted into such forces, and
shall not be discharged from such position without cause within one year after such
restoration." This provision was continued in effect by the Service Extension Act
of 1941, 55 STAT. 627, 50 U.S.C. App. § 357. Identical provisions are contained
in the Army Reserve and Retired Personnel Law of 1940, 54 STAT. 859, 891, 50
U.S.C. App. § 403; and in the Merchant Marine Reemployment Act, 57 STAT. 162,
50 U.S.C. App. § 1472 (1943). Similar provisions are found in the Selective
Service Act of 1948, 62 STAT. 604, 50 U.S.C. App. § 459. These statutes are ad-
ministered by the Department of Labor.
2 Severance pay, retroactive pay increases, pension participation, insurance benefits
and other advantages are often contingent on similar requirements, and the discus-
sion is applicable to them except where distinctions are made.
3 See COLLECTIVE BARGAINING PROVISIONS - VACATIONS, HOLIDAYS AND WEEK-
END WORK (Bur. Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't Labor, Bull. No. 908-2) 4 (1948).
"Days of compensated service" is occasionally the test; sometimes it is "on the pay-
roll"; more often it is "in the employ." Some contracts are silent on the point, and
others base vacation pay on the employee's earnings, pay rate, or hours worked in
some earlier period.
' 328 U.S. 275, 66 Sup. Ct. 1105 (1946).
-54 STAT. 890, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 308(b) and 308(c) (1940).
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tion" and the general guaranty of "seniority, status and pay" included
thereunder in 8(b); that under the Fishgold rule and the liberal con-
struction of the statute required by that case, a veteran is entitled to all
increases in all types of benefits which he would have received solely
through passage of time had he remained at work instead of entering
military service; that no contract or custom can cut down these benefits;
and that his military service should be counted toward meeting vacation
pay requirements.6
II
8(c) as a Limitation on Vacation Pay
Both the "considered as having been on furlough or leave of absenc6"
and "insurance or other benefits" clauses were added to the original pro-
visions of the Act in an effort to make it a dearer and more effective
means of protecting veterans. 7 In fact, the language and purpose of the
"other benefits" clause strongly intimate that it protects and conserves
only those interests of the employee involving contributions made by him
or in his behalf, a financial outlay having present money value which
should not be forfeited or impaired through absences and non-payment
of premiums, but which does not continue to accumulate automatically
during the veteran's military service.8 That the "other benefits" must be
'One other interpretation of the statute is possible: Vacation pay is an incident of
seniority and the clause "without loss of seniority" in 8(c) insures the veteran the
right to count military service toward vacation pay for all purposes. However, as
will be seen later, in many cases the right to vacation pay seems not to be an incident
solely of seniority; where it is such an incident, it appears that 8 (b) would protect
the veteran to the same extent as 8 (c).
786 CONG. REC. 10,914 (1940). The amendment substituted the present section
8(c). The previous language was: "Any person who is restored to a position in
accordance with the provisions of paragraph (A) or (B) of subsection (b) shall so
be restored without loss of seniority, insurance participation or benefits, or other
benefits, and such person shall not be discharged from such position without cause
within 1 year after such restoration." Id. at 10,079. Senator Davis, author of, the
amendment, regarded the change as increasing the protection previously afforded;
the committee chairman, Senator Sheppard, concurred. Id. at 10,914.
"Representative May stated, "I do not think it [Section 8(c)] would protect any
employee against that provision [war-risk clause in a group insurance policy] be-
cause it is a provision within a contract .. " 86 CONG. REC. 11,702 (1940). That
is, this section protects and conserves rights existing at the time of induction, but has
no bearing on additional rights, one way or another. Further, the "other benefits"
provision "refers solely to the benefits to which he was entitled up to the time he
left his employment" and means that "if a man goes out to serve his country under
tlis conscription plan and comes back he assumes his prior status less one year's
payment." Id. at 10,107. "The chief purpose of the amendment is to preserve the
seniority rights of the thousands and hundreds of thousands of railroad employees
and other employees of that character who have certain seniority privileges on the
railroads. In other words, we put them on furlough during the time they were in
the service and they will even be permitted to count this time on their retirement...
Id. at 11,702.
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"offered by the employer" suggests that this clause excludes advantages
based on specific quid pro quo in the employment, and relates only to
the employer's contributions to the general security and welfare of his
employees simply on account of the employment relation, without regard
to individual merits or services renderedY Also, 8(c) states that "any
person who is restored to a position" shall receive the benefits mentioned,
but it is clear that a veteran has certain of these rights-for example,
the right to his proper place on the seniority list-even if he is never
restored.1" It can hardly be objected that 8 (b) is merely descriptive and
offers no affirmative protection beyond that contained in 8(c), for the
8(b) guaranty of "former position or position of like seniority, status
and pay" on its face is considerably broader than the 8(c) "without loss
of seniority" and "leave of absence" clauses. For these reasons, it appears
doubtful that 8(c) limits a veteran's vacation pay to that granted other
employees on leave of absence.
Congress seems to have rejected this view by inserting a new provision
in the 1948 Act,1 ' that the veteran should be restored so as "to give him
such status in his employment as he would have enjoyed if he had con-
tinued in such employment continuously"; this was considered merely to
express what the statute previously meant."2 Further, to consider the
On this view, pension rights and group insurance might be "other benefits," and
vacation pay tied to production and performance of work would not.
" 8 (c) takes effect only after restoration. MacLaughlin v. Union Switch and Signal
Co., 70 F.Supp. 744 (W.D. Pa. 1947), revd o? other grounds, 166 F.2d 46 (3rd
Cir. 1948); Murphy v. Chrysler Corp., 306 Mich. 610, 11 N.W.2d 261 (1943).
See also Dwyer v. Crosby Co., 167 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1948). Some benefits dearly
protected by 8 (c), say insurance and pensions, can take effect only after restoration,
in most cases. "Neither grammatically nor substantively could the discharge provi-
sion be given effect without reference to the prior restoration clauses." Trailmobile
Co. v. Whirls, 331 U.S. 40, 55, 67 Sup. Ct. 982, 989 (1947). Rights after restora-
tion need not depend solely on 8 (c), of course; but if 8 (c) is a general limitation on
8 (b), there can be no rights before restoration under 8 (b).
'Selective Service Act of 1948, 62 STAT. 604, 50 U.S.C. APP. § 459 (c) (z) (1950).
The provision was added by the Senate Armed Services Committee. "The Commit-
tee has taken the position that as a matter of policy, no reemployment rights should
be granted to personnel serving under this legislation which would contravene, or
take precedence over, reemployment rights now enjoyed by men who already have
been in the services, and who are now receiving benefits under the 1940 Act. For
that reason no important substantive changes have been made in the provisions of
the 1940 act." SEN. REP. No. 1288, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1948). In com-
menting specifically upon the new section, the Senate committee added that "the
provisions of this legislation differ from those contained in the Selective Training
and Service Act of 1940, as amended, in that [this] is specifically stated to be the
intent of Congress." (Italics supplied) Id. at 16.
'Aeronautical Lodge v. Campbell, 337 U.S. 521, 69 Sup. Ct. 1287 (1949) so held
under the 1940 statute; accord, MacLaughlin v. Union Switch & Signal Co., 166
F.2d 46 (3rd Cir. 1948); Dwyer v. Crosby, 167 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1948); In re
Walker's Estate, 185 N.Y. Misc. 1046, 53 N.Y.S.2d 106 (Surr. Ct. 1944). In
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"other benefits" clause as the sole provision protecting vacation pay would
mean a veteran could be denied pensions, vacation pay, or increases in bene-
fits established during his absence, since the rule in effect at the time of
his induction would govern.13 The statute thus would espouse the very
discrimination it was designed to avoid. Veterans inducted at different
times would receive widely varying treatment, and the employer could
not revise the scale of benefits uniformly for veterans and non-veter-
ans; 14 such lack of flexibility would greatly disturb labor relations. Nor
does the clause "considered as having been on furlough or leave of ab-
sence" restrict the veteran to vacation pay granted other employees on
leave. If it did, a custom or contract provision that employees on leave
could not accumulate seniority would prevent veterans from doing so,
contrary to the Fishgold principle. 5
That principle establishes the veteran's right to step back on the "escala-
tor" of advantages at the point he would have occupied but for his absence
in military service, so that he suffers no "loss of ground" by reason of his
absence.' 6 According to the Supreme Court's definition of the escalator
principle in Oakley v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.:
An honorably discharged veteran, covered by the statute, was entitled
by the Act to be restored not to a position which would be the precise
equivalent of that which he had left when he joined the Armed Forces, but
rather to a position which, on the moving escalator of terms and conditions
Spearmon v. Thompson, 173 F.2d 452, 454 (3rd Cir. 1949), the court stated that
the statutory addition made by the 1940 Act to contractual rights gives the veterans
such "status ... [as would have] been achieved without interruption of their work
through military service." The real question is, of course, what job incidents accrue
as a result of remaining "in the employ."
" Such result is not the intent or effect of the statute. A collective bargaining agree-
ment negotiated during the veteran's absence in the armed services confers vacation
rights on him to the same extent as on those remaining behind. Mentzel v. Elizabeth
Iron Works, 167 F.2d 299 (3rd Cir. 1948). See also the cases granting rehired
veterans wage increases (occurring during their absence) resulting from general
wage raises, increased prosperity of the employer, or increased importance or diffi-
culty of the job, collected in INTERPRETATIVE BULLETIN AND LEGAL GUIDE, VET-
ERANS' REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS (U. S. Dep't Labor) § 6.2 (1948) and Supple-
ment, § 6.2 (July, 1948).
'
4 Aeronautical Industrial Lodge v. Campbell, 337 U.S. 521, 69 Sup. Ct. 1287
(1948) indicates this is not the effect of the act.
' It has been suggested that the first "furlough or leave" clause in 8 (c) assures the
veteran of the benefits of rules in effect upon his restoration, and that the "other
benefits" clause assures him of the advantages of rules in effect when he is inducted.
If the clauses can be read together so as to cover accrual of all such benefits in ac-
cordance with either rule while the veteran is absent in military service, there is no
objection to this view, even though the language of the statute itself seems not to
warrant such a bifurcation. But where employees on other types of leave are denied
accrual of benefits, this interpretation begs the question.
"Fishgold v. Sullivan Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 284, 66 Sup. Ct. 1105, 1110 (1946).
"The Act was designed to protect the veteran in several ways. He who was called
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affecting that particular employment, would be comparable to the position
which he would have held if he had remained continuously in his civilian
employment.17
The rationale of the escalator principle is not dependent on the "without loss
of seniority" clause of 8 (c)' s and applies to job features other than senior-
ity. For, as the Court observed in Aeronamuical Industrial Lodge v. Camp-
bell, the veteran "becomes the beneficiary of those gains" created in his
absence, a result at odds with limiting him to the gains accruing to those
on leave or furlough."0 Many other remarks of the Court, though not made
in consideration of this point, offer some additional support to the view
that the veteran may have rights under 8(b) beyond those granted em-
ployees on leave of absence and beyond those protected by 8(c).2
to the colors was not to be penalized on his return by reason of his absence from
his civilian job."
"Thus he does not step back on the seniority escalator at the point he stepped
off. He steps back on at the precise point he would have occupied had he kept his
position continuously during the war." Id. at 284-85, 66 Sup. Ct. at 1111.
"As we have said, these provisions guarantee the veteran against loss of position
or loss of seniority by reason of his absence. He acquires not only the same seniority
he had; his service in the armed services is counted as service in the plant so that he
does not lose ground by reason of his absence." Id. at 285, 66 Sup. Ct. at 1111.
"Congress protected the veteran against loss of ground or demotion on his re-
turn." Id. at 286, 66 Sup. Ct. at 1111.
"Oakley v. Louisville & N.R.R., 338 U.S. 278, 283, 70 Sup. Ct. 119, 122 (1949).
" That clause of itself does not require any escalator. It does little to establish what
the seniority is which the veteran is not to lose. Is it what he had when he entered
military service? The bare words of the clause favor this construction, but this is
also clearly protected in 8 (b) as "seniority." Is it what he would have acquired
under rules in effect at the time of his induction? Or at the time of his reinstate-
ment? Apparently the Supreme Court rejected all of these views in favor of the
escalator upon which the veteran rides by authority of the statute.
" 337 U.S. 521, 526, 69 Sup. Ct. 1287, 1289 (1949). The Court's remarks that
the Act gives the serviceman "the status of one who has been 'on furlough or leave
of absence'," and that he "is not to be favored as a furloughed employee as against
his fellows" do not mean he is limited to advantages accruing to his fellow employees
on leave; the change in the collective bargaining agreement which, the court held,
must neither favor nor prejudice the veteran was not one affecting employees on
leave, but one affecting all employees. Whether the additional protection arises
under the "furlough or leave of absence" clause or under 8 (b) is of relatively minor
importance so long as the principle is recognized that neither this clause nor the
"other benefits" clause denies the veteran advantages because they do not accrue to
other employees on leave. Since the Campbell case does not seem inconsistent with
the view that this protection lies in 8 (b), reasons indicated in the text favor that
view.
" The Court has frequently equated "position" with "seniority," "status" and "pay"
and indicated the veteran must not lose ground in respect of any of these. In the
Fishgold case, it said, "the veteran is entitled to be restored to his old position. ...
If... he is demoted, his status, which the act is designed to protect, has been af-
fected. . . .He would then lose his old position." (Italics supplied) 328 U.S. a:
286, 66 Sup. Ct. at 1112. In Trailmobile Co. v. Whirls, 331 U.S. 40, 57 and 53 n.
23, 67 Sup. Ct. 982, 990 and 988 n.23 (1947), the Court indicated that "the in-
EDune
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Lower courts have vacillated on this issue. The Third Circuit held in
Mentzel v. Diamond"l that a veteran who met all other requirements was
entitled to count military service as part of the "five years service" which,
under the collective bargaining agreement, entitled him to a second week
of vacation. Treatment accorded other employees on leave or furlough was
not considered. "The veteran is to be treated, as far as benefits under the
Act are concerned, as though he had worked every day at the plant,"22 the
opinion stated. This followed the same coures decision in MacLaughlin v.
Union Switch and Signal Co.' that, where vacations were "based on total
service to and including December 31 of the preceding calendar year" and
could be "taken only during the current calendar year," a veteran inducted
before December 31 was entitled to vacation pay for that year, payable in
the year of his return. December 31 was no "magic day" establishing
eligibility, but "merely a terminal date stipulated for computation of vaca-
tion rights";24 the Act "tolled the running of the calendar year, so that the
year of return became the calendar year. There can be little quarrel with
such a reading of the Act.2 5  However, in Dougherty v. General Motors
Corp.,'2 under a provision that an employee with five years seniority should
cidents of employment" were embraced in "the right to employment itself," that the
year's protection of 8(c) extends to "pay" (not mentioned in 8(c)), and that
"seniority" is part of the veteran's "position." And in the Campbell case, it held the
veteran's "rights, including seniority" were defined by the agreement adopted in his
absence. 337 U.S. at 527, 69 Sup. Cr. at 1290. But "seniority" is the only part
of the veteran's "position" specifically protected by 8(c); therefore, 8(b) also
affirmatively protects the veteran's position. The need for belaboring what might
seem an obvious point will appear in the examination of lower court cases on va-
cation pay.
21167 F.2d 299 (1948).
'Id. at 301.
21166 F.2d 46 (1948).
' Contra: Flynn v. Ward Leonard Electric Co., 18 CCH LABOR CASES 65,710
(S.D. N.Y. 1950) Zagaiski v. Carboloy Co., 88 F. Supp. 162 (E.D. Mich. 1950).
Both cases involved retroactive wage increases given to employees on the active pay-
roll on a specified date; the veterans had worked part of the period for which the
increase was granted, were inducted before the crucial date, and sought the increase
for the time they worked. An earlier decision in the Flynn case by a different judge,
on motion to dismiss the complaint, was in accord with the MacDaughlin case.
84 F. Supp. 399 (S.D. N.Y. 1949).
"It cannot be objected that the court's comment, "Vacation advantages accorded
employees are certainly no less to be prized than such benefits as pensions, bonuses,
and participation in insurance programs," shows that vacation pay is protected only
by the "other benefits" clause. The court also spoke of the "vacation escalator";
there is no escalator in 8 (c) for "other benefits," so the escalator must operate by
license of 8 (b) and the comment was merely descriptive. Of course, even if va-
cation pay werd among the "other benefits," it would not necessarily be excluded
from "seniority, status and pay" under 8(b).
" 176 F.2d 561 (3rd Cit. 1949), cert. denied, 70 Sup. Ct. 494 (1950).
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receive vacation pay of 4 per cent of his previous year's earnings, a veteran
reinstated in 1946 was denied vacation pay for that year. Two justifications
were advanced: (1) the provision did not violate the statute "as long as the
intent and operation do not place veterans in a position inferior to that of
non-veterans on leave of absence"; and (2) the effect of the provision was
to deny vacation pay to any employee who had no 1945 earnings, and this
the Act does not forbid so long as veterans and non-veterans are treated
alike.Y The first reason shows a substantial retreat from the Mentzel deci-
sion. The second stems from interpreting as a requirement of eligibility a
provision seeming to relate only to the amount of the vacation pay. To
paraphrase the MacLaughlin opinion, this was "merely a base period stipu-
lated for the computation of vacation pay"; thus it is inconsistent with the
"no magic day" rationale of that case.
Similar difficulties have beset the Second Circuit. The collective bar-
gaining agreement in Siaskewicz v. General Electric Co.2" provided that
employees reengaged with continuity of service must work six months
before being eligible for a vacation; a longer vacation was given to those
with five years' "continuous service." Though holding that a veteran who
was reinstated too late to work six months in the vacation year was not en-
tided to vacation pay, the court seemed to consider the five-year increase a
perquisite of seniority. But the reef lay just beneath the surface. When
confronted by a collective bargaining agreement providing vacation pay
for those "in the employ for 26 weeks," the court held the Act to require the
veteran to be considered "in the employ" during his military service. How-
ever, it is the "position" rather than the "employ" to which the veteran
must be restored under the Act. Advantages accruing to the veteran's
"position" during his military service are only those accruing to other
employees on leave. Hence a veteran reinstated for only 25 weeks was not
entitled to vacation pay because "it was an essential element of the case
that the company have a rule or practice treating employees 'on leave of
absence' as entitled to include their leave within the twenty-six weeks, and
it was not proved." '29 By this reasoning, "in the employ" is taken to entitle
' As a third reason, the court stated the provision did not discriminate against veter-
ans because neither the union nor General Motors sought or contemplated restriction
of veterans' vacation benefits. This point lies outside the present inquiry.
'166 F.2d 463 (1948).
'Dwyer v. Crosby Co., 167 F.2d 567 (1948). "In the employ," as used in the
contract, does not, of course, necessarily mean the same thing as it does under the
Act. Cf. INTERPRETATIVE BULLETIN, supra note 13 at § 3.22, stating that the
meaning of "temporary" in the statute depends on the facts of the case rather than
the language of the contract. However, where the language of the contract coincides
with the wording of the statute, the absence of evidence as to special meaning to be
given the contract should favor similarity of meaning, and not (as here) the reverse.
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the veteran only to the protection of 8(c) and to the treatment accorded
other employees on leave; and the advantages of "employ" do not accrue
under the Act during the employee's military service. And, in the court's
view, either the advantages of the "position" to which the veteran must be
restored do not accumulate during his military service, or vacation pay is
not part of that "position." In the former case, the entire Act is reduced to
meaning the veteran shall be restored "without loss of benefits" he had
when inducted, a result contrary to the Fishgold requirement that seniority
mtst accumulate during military service;30 in the latter, the "seniority,
status and pay" guaranteed by 8(b) are ignored and the escalator principle
cabined in a manner contrary to the Fishgold and Oakley definitions of it.
3 1
No such doubts distracted the Ninth Circuit. It held a veteran not
entitled to include time in the army in "total years of full time continuous
employment" on which severance pay was based, because the rule in
' See note 7 supra for Congress's rejection of a version of 8 (c) which was so limited.
By importing the "position-employ" distinction into the Act in its attempt to avoid
the difficulty noted in the text, the Second Circuit seems to have created greater diffi-
culties. Whatever 8 (b) does not do as to "employ," it guarantees the veteran the
same "position" he formerly held, including advantages accumulated during military
service. Loeb v. Kivo, 169 F.2d 346 (2d Cit. 1948); Trusteed Funds v. Dacey, 160
F.2d 413 (1st Cir. 1947); Martin v. John S. Doane Co., 164 F.2d 531 (1st Cit.
1947); Levine v. Berman, 161 F.2d 386 (7th Cit. 1947), holding the veteran
entitled to pay increases due, not to length of service, but to expansion of the enter-
prise, war-induced prosperity of the employer, and a general rise in wage or salary
levels; Morris v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 171 F.2d 579 (7th Cit. 1948), cert. denied
336 U.S. 967, 69 Sup. Ct. 938 (1949); Conner v. Pennsylvania R.R., 177 F.2d 854
(D.C. Cit. 1949), petition for cert. pending; Payne v. Wright Aeronautical Corp.,
162 F.2d 549 (3rd Cit. 1947), holding a returning veteran must be given promo-
tion opportunities and seniority credit which he would have had by remaining at
work instead of entering military service. Contra: Raulins v. Memphis Union Sta-
tion Co., 168 F.2d 466 (6th Cit. 1948) semble.
""The real trouble however is . . . it assumes . . . that employment within the
meaning of the Act is something wholly distinct and separate from its incidents, in-
cluding seniority, rates of pay, etc." Trailmobile Co. v. Whirls, 331 U.S. 40, 55, 67
Sup. Ct 982, 989 (1947). Cf. Feore v. North Shore Bus Co., 161 F.2d 552 (2d
Cit. 1947), holding a returned veteran near the head of the seniority list not ex-
empt from the requirement that in order to choose a desirable run he must make
his choice on the quarterly dates established by the collective bargaining contract.
The court stated that the "leave of absence" clause in 8 (c) must be considered in
determining whether the veteran has been offered a job of "like seniority, status and
pay" as required by 8 (b), thus implying 8 (c) is not the sole provision dealing with
job incidents there listed; two points made by the court showed the "leave or fur-
lough" test is to be applied sparingly: (1) the veteran must have a reasonable
chance to comply with the condition imposed on those on leave, i.e. there must be
no long delay between "picks"; and (2) the condition itself must be reasonable to
be valid, as this one was because the employees themselves, in a referendum in which
the veteran had a chance to participate, voted almost unanimously against the "bump-
ing" process which the granting of the veteran's claim would have caused. See also
the remarks concerning reasonableness of the contract provisions in the Campbell
case, 337 U.S. at 527-528, 69 Sup. Ct. at 1290-91.
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effect when the veteran was inducted did not permit employees on other
types of leave to include leave time. The court reached this conclusion di-
rectly, in an opinion uncomplicated by notice of the escalator principle,
mention of 8 (b), or distinction between the "leave of absence" and "other
benefits" clauses of 8(c).3 2
To say that credit of military service toward vacation pay is by 8(c)
restricted to the credit allowed for other kinds of leave time leads to
serious inconsistencies with the structure and purpose of the Act. It means
that if the veterans are protected without the statute, the statute also pro-
tects them; and if they are not protected without it, the statute does not aid
them.
Apparently the Supreme Court considers that the escalator on which
the veteran rides during his military service carries all incidents of the job
dependent on length of employment, including the right to or duration of
the vacation. Thus it is unnecessary to determine whether vacation pay is
included in "other benefits" under 8(c),11 for the veteran can assert vaca-
tion righ to any extent that they are conferred by the guaranty in 8(b) of
a position of like seniority, status and pay."
III
Vacation Pay as Part of "Position" Under 8(b)
"Loss of position" against which the Fishgold case held that 8(b) pro-
tects the veteran includes the loss of any significant elements of the position.
Thus the veteran is protected from demotion, from loss of opportunity for
sure advancement, and from loss of general pay increases. 4 He i, also pro-
' Seattle Star, Inc. v. Randolph, 168 F.2d 274 (1948); accord, Woods v. Glen Alden
Coal Co., 73 F.Supp. 87 (M.D. Pa. 1947); Cushnier v. Ford Motor Co., 17 CCH
LABOR CASES 65,616 (E.D. Mich. 1950); Brown v. Watt Car & Wheel Co., 17
CCH LABOR CASES 65,293 (S.D. Ohio 1948); Horan v. Todd Shipyards Corp.,
13 CCH LABOR CASES 63,942 (S.D. N.Y. 1947). In the Brown and Horan
cases, the "other benefits" clause of 8(c) was considered along with the "leave of
absence" clause. Sometimes, as in the Woods case, the court was troubled by the
fact that collective bargaining contracts are of limited duration and vacation pay
provisions relate only to specific years; there is thus no rule in effect at time of
induction applicable to the period after restoration. Some courts tried to solve the
problem in part by considering the applicability of the contract in effect on the
veteran's return, but ignored the escalator rule, the applicability of 8(b), and the
fact that the rule in effect at the time of induction need not, under the "other bene-
fits" clause, apply to the period of the veteran's return. The Metzel agreement was
negotiated during the veteran's absence, and caused the Third Court of Appeals no
such difficulties because of the court's frank recognition that the statute was designed
to give special protection to those on military leave.
'Unless, indeed, the veteran claims that the "other benefits" clause protects him
from a reduction of vacation rights applied uniformly to all other employees during
his absence in the armed forces; the Campbell case seems to make such argument
untenable.
" See note 30 supra.
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tected from impairment of his duties and responsibilities, and fiom loss of
fringe advantages such as desirable working hours or conditions and con-
venient housing. 35 The veteran has a right to general incteases in such
advantages even if no collective bargaining agreement or emsployer custom
confers them on employees on leave. Thus the veteran's right results from
the Act and cannot be reduced by contract or custom to the contrary30 His
"status" with respect to the level of benefits of his position is protected
against impairment resulting from his absence in military service. The
reasoning applies to vacation advantages as well as to the others listed."'
In fact, vacation pay is so much a part of the veteran's total "position" that
its receipt was held to show the position itself was other than temporary.38
Vacation rights may also be part of the veteran's "seniority" or "pay."
In Siaskewicz v. General Electric Co., it was said that vacation rights may
be "merely a perquisite of seniority" in some circumstances. 9 The Mentzel
case so held; and, in Winton v. City Truck Co., correct computation of
seniority under 8(b) was held to confer an added week of vacation."0
Likewise, in the Siaskewicz case, the court indicated that vacation pay may
be part of the veteran's "pay," saying, "vacation rights are not pay unless
they are for work actually done."'" A similar remark was made in the
MacLaughlin case.42 Vacation pay would seem to be as much a part of
the veteran's total compensation as the right to his former rate of pay, or
the opportunity to take advantage of an improved business environment.
Hence it.would be protected under 8(b) rather than under 8(c), for the
'The cases are collected in INTERP.ETATWVE BULLETIN, supra note 13, at §§ 6.42
and 6.44.
"Fishgold v. Sullivan Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 285, 66 Sup. Ct. 1105, 1111
(1946).
'In Mentzel v. Diamond, 167 F.2d 299 (1948), the Third Court of Appeals, to
support granting vacation pay to the veteran, cited its own decision in Gauweiler
v. Elastic Stop Nut Co., 162 F.2d 448 (1947), that veterans were bound by a col-
lective bargaining agreement made during their absence, giving union officials top
seniority. The description in the Campbell case of collective bargaining as a "con-
tinuous process," the incidents of which are not "frozen" while the veteran is in
military service, bears out this view.
"E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Martin, 174 F.2d 602 (6th Cir. 1949).
166 F.2d 463, 466 (1948). Dwyer v. Crosby Co., 167 F.2d 567 (1948) does
not overrule the Siaskewicz case on this point, each case was bottomed on interpre-
tation of a particular collective bargaining agreement.
" Civil No. 7219, D. Mass., Jan. 20, 1949.
- 166 F.2d 463, 466 (2d Cir. 1948).
" 166 F.2d 46, 48 (3rd Cit. 1948). However, the court's emphasis on the unequal
contributions of work expected from individual employees - that is, the lack of a
direct relation between time worked and amount of vacation pay in each case -
would perhaps show that their vacation pay was an incident of "status" rather than
pay."
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latter section does not mention "pay." On this view, moreover, whether
vacation pay or other advantages have been "fully earned" by performance
of every work requirement, as some courts have thought, is not necessarily
decisive of the veteran's claim;43 his claim is largely one for a present level
or rate of compensation for current employment rather than pay for past
work.
44
It seems plain that to deny veterans vacation pay merely because no
provision confers it on employees on leave or furlough is an erroneous
interpretation of the statute. But it is equally plain that in every vacation
pay case the controlling element may be the interpretation of a collective
bargaining contract or of an employer practice. Vacation pay is a job in-
cident entirely dependent on the existence of such agreement or practice,
since there is no right to it merely on account of the employment relation.45
3 The MacLaughlin case first announced the "fully earned" view, though it was not
necessary to the decision. This led to a curious result in Horan v. Todd Shipyards,
13 CCH LABoR CAsEs 63,942 (S.D. N.Y. 1947), where the court denied vacation
pay prorated in accordance with the proportion of the required number of hours
which the veteran was able to work on return from service. The court said that
"vacation rights cannot be considered 'pay' under Section 8 (b) (B) of the Act until
they have been 'fully earned'." It is difficult to follow this reasoning. A vacation
of one year for each past year of service, granted on condition the employee had
worked for six of the preceding twelve months might be "fully earned" as to the
additional weeks resulting from years of employment after the first. Moreover, the
right to accrue a vacation could easily be considered part of the employee's "pay", by
analogy to this rate of pay, which is protected by the statute as much as the pay due
him on departure for military service.
Even if vacation pay were only "partly" earned because the veteran worked only
part of the required period after return, it would seem that this has no bearing on
whether it should be considered "pay", since a weekly wage only 60% earned be-
cause of absence on two days is nonetheless "pay". See Flynn v. Ward Leonard
Electric Co., 84 F. Supp.399, 401 (S.D. N.Y. 1949), holding, on motion to dismiss
the complaint, that veterans would be penalized "if they were denied equal pay for
equal work done, merely because they were in the armed forces on October 10,
1943." Contra: Flynn v. Ward Leonard Electric Co., 18 CCH LABOR CASES
65,710 (S.D. N.Y. 1950) (later decision on merits); Zagaiski v. Carboloy Co., 88
F. Supp. 162 (E.D. Mich. 1950).
"It follows that the veteran is not entitled to vacation pay received by on-the-job
employees during the years he is in military service. In the debate on the statute,
Senators Sheppard and Danaher made it clear that the employer was not liable for
any retirement insurance contributions the veteran would have had to pay had he
remained on the job. 86 CoNG. REc. 10,107 (1940). Fear of some such result
may underly the lower court decisions in the Dwyer, Mentzel, MacLaughlin, and
Woods cases, confining vacation pay to the "other benefits" clause, supra note 32;
and in fact such claim was advanced by the MacLaughlin veterans. Reported arbi-
tration awards in this field have generally favored the veteran, possibly because the
arbitrators are less inhibited by the fear of establishing a precedent. Favorable:
2 BNA LAB. ARB. REP. 227; 3 Id. 227, 859; 4 Id. 186, 306, 529, 594; 6 Id. 238,
403; 7 Id. 746; 8 Id. 100, 740. Unfavorable: 4 BNA LAB. ARB. REP. 280; 5 Id.
342, 508; 6 Id. 164, 369, 729, 767; 12 Id. 201.
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Agreement or practice can make vacation rights depend wholly or partially
on performance of work, as recompense for the work; this the Act does not
forbid. Denial of vacation rights to those on leave shows that presence on
the job is required for accrual of the rights, a requirement which the Act
excuses for veterans. Such denial, without more, or even coupled with a
requirement or presence on the active payroll for an insignificant time, say
a day or a pay period, does not show that vacation rights are recompense for
performance of work. Rather, the minuscule amount of work required
indicates the opposite, that performance of work is not the essential factor
in the right.40 To the extent vacation pay depends on circumstances other
than performance of work during the period the veteran is in military ser-
vice, he should receive it. And in ascertaining this extent, courts will find
it necessary to explore the meaning of each collective bargaining agree-
ment and examine closely the facts of each veteran's case. 7
"Cf. the following remarks in the Campbell case concerning the existence of senior-
ity apart from the contract: "In providing that a veteran shall be restored to the po-
sition he had before he entered the military service 'without loss of seniority,' § 8 of
the Act uses the term 'seniority' without definition. It is thus apparent that Con-
gress was not creating a system of seniority but recognizing its operation as part of
the process of collective bargaining. We must, therefore, look to the conventional
uses of the seniority system in the process of collective bargaining in order to deter-
mine the rights of seniority which the Selective Service Act guaranteed the veteran.
Barring legislation not here involved, seniority rights derive their scope and signifi-
cance from union contracts, confined as they almost exclusively are to unionized in-
dustry. See Trailmobile Co. v. Whirls, 331 U.S. 40, 53, n.21. There are great
variations in the use of the seniority principle through collective bargaining bearing
on the time when seniority begins, determination of the units subject to the same
seniority, and the consequences which flow from seniority." 337 U.S. at 526, 69
Sup. Cr at 1290.
" It might be argued that a contract limiting vacation pay which persons on ordinary
leave of absence are granted defines the rights which the Act guarantees the veteran,
and that the Act protects only those vacation rights earned in accordance with the
terms of the contract. The method of earning vacation pay would then be regarded
as a binding and valid condition of the veteran's job, like the condition in Feore v.
North Shore Bus Co., Inc., 161 F.2d 552 (2d Cit. 1947). However, requiring
performance of work (as distinguished from presence in the employ) for vacation
rights which are in fact a reward for other features of the employment relation is
to penalize the veteran because of his absence in military service. The condition
in the Feore case had no such defect. It remains a fact that veterans are at a disad-
vantage because they are most often unable to meet the conditions; moreover, their
absence is involuntary and for ends not personal; the purpose of the statute, said
Fishgold, is to insure that performance of this public duty secures them the same
benefits they would have had had they shirked that duty; the results of the con-
tractual language, not its form, must fit the statute.
' If the court does not do so, it would seem that in the absence of a provision requir-
ing, say "800 hours of compensated service" or "six months work" in the vacation
year, the veteran should prevail, as in the Mentzel case., For abortive efforts to in-
terpret collective bargaining agreements, apparently with little or no assistance from
counsel, see the Horan and Cushnier cases, supra note 32.
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Vacations or vacation pay, as the MacLaughlin case pointed out, are of
course to some extent compensation for work related to production, in the
sense of not being largess or a gratuity and of being given only on account
of the employment relation. In addition, actual vacations serve to some
extent the purpose of recuperation or relaxation from fatigue of a job and
in this respect are contingent on actual performance of work. On the other
hand, it must be remembered that industrial vacations in fact very often take
the form of pay in lieu of vacation rather than a rest period, as has been
true in all cases thus far decided by the courts. Also, an increase in the
length of vacation (or the amount of vacation pay) is related to the em-
ployee's loyalty to and long tenure with the company and to the desire of
the employer to retain a trained and reliable labor force. If the purpose of
the increase is to insure a stable staff by encouraging employees to continue
work with the company and identify themselves with its long-term wel-
fare, or even to avoid contributions to short-term employees, the return of
the veteran to the job is sufficient indication that he is not a bird of passage.
The increase in rights is not connected with the period of labor for that
particular year, nor even with specified amounts of labor for preceding
years.
Under the typical provision for one week of vacation after one year of
service and two weeks after five years, the second week of vacation is not
related to performance of work in the particular year in which the vacation
occurs but is given on account of length of service with the employer and
loyalty to him. Giving one week of vacation for one year in the employ
shows that only the first week of the vacation is given for that particular
year's work. Where the veteran's pre-military employment plus time spent
in military service plus his post-military employment total five years, he
should receive the second week of vacation even though he is not at work on
the required days in that year. He should also receive a part of the first
week of vacation proportionate to the time he has worked during the year
of his return, since the veteran has in fact "earned" this portion of the vaca-
tion.48  The same principles apply where the vacation provision contains
different requirements: the veteran is entitled to credit military service
towards whatever part of the vacation or vacation pay is not dependent on
the actual performance of work, and is entitled to such pro rata share of the
'Other methods of computation may be imagined. Veterans have argued that they
should receive the full amount of vacation pay, because the statute excuses their
failure to meet work requirements. The entire vacation might be prorated to the
proportion of the work requirement which the veteran has met. The veteran's rate
of work following reinstatement might be projected over the entire year, and his va-
cation computed accordingly. Or his work in the years of departure and return
might be tacked together to enable him to meet the work requirement (cf. the remark
in the MacLaughlin case that the Act "tolled the running of the calendar year,"
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remainder as his actual work during the year of his return bears to the
required work 49
Admittedly an element of speculation is involved in this treatment of
vacation pay; but the Act necessarily gives rise to this in protecting the
veteran against loss of ground. No great hardship is imposed on the em-
ployer, since the veteran's replacement will have received less vacation pay
than the veteran would have, by about as much as the veteran's increase.
The veteran receives no advantage over those remaining on the job, since
the amount of his credit for military service could not exceed that accruing
to the other employees for time on the job. There is no question here of
exempting veterans generally from changes in collective bargaining agree-
ments which alter the framework of job benefits, seniority, or incidents of
employment. Likewise, there is no proposal here to restrict the freedom of
an employer or of a union to bargain collectively concerning this framework.
Once the framework is established, however, the Act requires that a veteran's
time in military service be treated as time on the job so as to enable him to
reach that status, that level of privilege or benefit, that rate of compensa-
tion, that degree of advancement -in short, that "position" in the frame-
work -which he would have reached had not military service blocked his
progress. And this credit for military service must continue through subse-
quent years of the veteran's employment, so long as it may affect his vaca-
tion rights.50
supra, page 33). All such computations seem further removed than that in the text
from the "escalator" rule and the reasons underlying the existence of vacation pay.
Where vacation is time off, and must be taken at a specified time, the veteran loses
it unless he is on the job at that time, for the same reason that he is entitled to no
vacation pay for the years he is absent. See note 44 supra.
"To take an extreme example, assume a provision requiring 800 hours work in
each of the five preceding years, in order to be eligible for vacation pay. A veteran
who worked 800 hours in 1941, spent 1942-1944 in military service and worked
400 hours in 1945 following his return to the job would be entitled to 30 per cent
of the vacation pay given those steadily on the job. Where the amount of vacation
pay is a percentage of previous earnings and the veteran had no such earnings be-
cause of his absence in military service (as in the Dougherty case), he should be
given constructive earnings of the average employee doing similar work. Vacation
pay for the year of the veteran's entry into military service should be determined
similarly. Under the provisions mentioned in the text, if he has five years service
at that time, he is entitled to one week of vacation, etc. However, payment would
not be required until the veteran returned to the job, since he has no rights under
the Act prior to qualifying for reinstatement.
' Oakley v. Louisville & N. R.R., 338 U.S. 278, 70 Sup. Ct. 119 (1949).
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